India Refuses to Acknowledge Court of Arbitration on IWT with Pakistan
NEW DELHI, Feb 2: India has refused to recognise the Court of Arbitration in The Hague and stay away from participating in its proceedings even as it presses ahead with fresh hearings and document orders under the Indus Waters Treaty framework.
The latest flashpoint is an order issued last week by the Court of Arbitration (CoA) constituted under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), directing that operational “pondage logbooks” from Indian hydroelectric plants be produced as part of what it calls the “Second Phase on the Merits.”
Despite India’s position, the Hague-based court is proceeding as if the treaty framework remains fully operational. In an order dated January 24, 2026, the court laid out a detailed hearing schedule for February 2-3, specifying that Pakistan alone will present arguments in person at the Peace Palace if India does not attend.
Five days later, in another order, the court, on Pakistan’s request, asked India to produce internal operational logbooks from the Baglihar and Kishanganga hydroelectric plants to examine whether India has historically “inflated” its pondage calculations. It also warned that if India did not comply, it may draw “adverse inferences” or ask Pakistan to submit the same documents obtained through neutral expert proceedings.
The court explicitly stated that India’s position on putting the treaty in abeyance “does not limit the competence of the court.” This is precisely the position India rejects. For New Delhi, however, this entire exercise is moot.
Government sources said on Monday that the “so-called illegally constituted” CoA continues to “hold parallel proceedings (in addition to the neutral expert). Since we do not recognise the legitimacy of the CoA, we do not respond to any of its communications.” “Additionally, as IWT is in abeyance, India is not bound to respond. This is a tactic by Pakistan to get us involved to show that we remain engaged.”
The background to this unprecedented standoff lies in New Delhi’s decision on April 23, 2025, a day after 26 civilians were killed in Pahalgam by Pakistan-linked terrorists. India formally placed the Indus Waters Treaty “in abeyance” and, for the first time since 1960, explicitly linked water cooperation to Pakistan’s continued use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy.
The move came alongside Operation Sindoor and marked a decisive shift in India’s Pakistan policy – cooperation cannot continue amid hostility. Islamabad’s reaction has been frantic. In the nine months since, Pakistan has summoned envoys, rushed delegations to world capitals, written to the United Nations, initiated over ten legal actions and held multiple international conferences – all centred on one narrative that India has targeted its most sensitive vulnerability.
Nearly 80-90 per cent of Pakistan’s agriculture depends on the Indus River system. Its water storage capacity barely covers a month of flow. Its major reservoirs – Tarbela and Mangla – are reportedly near dead storage. What was once a technical treaty arrangement has now become a strategic pressure point.
Under the IWT dispute mechanism, technical differences go to a neutral expert, while legal disputes go to a Court of Arbitration. India has consistently maintained that the current issues fall within the neutral expert’s domain and that Pakistan’s move to activate the Court amounts to “forum shopping.”
New Delhi’s refusal to engage with the CoA is rooted in this interpretation. By continuing to recognise only the neutral expert process, India is signalling that it will not allow Pakistan to expand the dispute into a broader legal and political theatre. The court’s latest orders show that it is trying to bridge information between the two parallel processes, something India sees as illegitimate.
What is unfolding in The Hague is not merely a legal dispute over hydroelectric calculations. It is the first real test of India’s decision to weaponise the treaty framework diplomatically after decades of restraint. For Pakistan, internationalising the issue is a survival imperative. For India, disengaging is a strategic choice.
The CoA may continue to issue orders, fix hearings and pass procedural directions. But without India’s participation and with the treaty officially in abeyance, the proceedings risk becoming a one-sided legal record rather than a binding adjudication.
(Manas Dasgupta)
